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 (i) 
I. Introduction 
Remarkably little is known about the boards of directors of New Zealand companies. The 
most recent research in this area was conducted by Turner (1985) who exam~ned CEO duality 
among listed companies for 1984, and Chandler and Henshall (1982) who examined board 
size, incidence of executive chairmanship and the proportion of outsiders on the boards of 
listed companies. In section two of this paper, I seek to expand on these earlier studies and, in 
particular, identity what changes in board structure have subsequently occurred. This analysis 
should give us a sense of the responsiveness of New Zealand companies to pressures to refonn 
corporate governance and the current state of corporate governance with respect to board 
structure characteristics. In the terminology of Boyd, Carroll, and Howard (1996), this 
analysis is micro and descriptive in nature. Micro, because I examine board variables, and 
descriptive because I am focusing on a single country, New Zealand. 
The approach taken in section two of this paper is not dissimilar to much previous 
corporate governance research. As Boyd et al. state, "much prior work has taken a 
descriptive rather than a comparative or explanatory focus" (1996, p.16). In fact 
international comparative research on board structure is a neglected area, with Boyd et 
al. (1996) commenting that: " ... international research on corporate governance appears 
surprisingly scarce" (p.3); and " ... much remains to be done to understand the function 
and effectiveness of international boards, and to provide comparisons across nations" 
(p.16). 
That international corporate governance research is so scarce it is somewhat surprising, 
especially when several studies indicate that there are in fact marked differences in board 
structure between some countries (Dalton, Kesner, and Rechner, 1988; Dalton and Kesner, 
1987). As Daily and Dalton (1994) demonstrate, these differences in board structure may 
have important implications for the performance and, ultimately, the very survival of 
corporations. Section three this paper examines previous international studies of board 
structure, making comparisons with the available New Zealand data. Section four of this 
paper contains a discussion and conclusions. 
2. Changes in Board Structure in New Zealand 
2.t Introduction 
Past studies of board composition in New Zealand have typically focused exclusively on board 
size (Laurent, 1971; Fogelberg and Laurent. 1974; Firth, 1987; Chandler and Henshall, 
1982; Turner, 1985). Two previous studies haVf~ looked at CEO duality (Chandler and 
Henshall, 1982; Turner, 1985) with one of these studies (Chandler and Henshall, 1982) also 
looking at the proportion of outsiders on corporate boards. 
I add to the existing data in two ways. First. I look at more board structure variables than 
previous local studies (refer Table I for a summary of the board structure variables of 
interest). Second, I update our knowledge of board structure vanables, and changes in board 
structure, by including data for the years 1980, 1985, 1987, 1990, and 1993. 
Previous studies of board structure in countries with large numbers of listed compames have 
usually examined the largest listed companies, e.g. the Forllme 500. Given the association 
between company size and some board composition variables, such studies do not provide an 
accurate portrayal of corporate governance in the countries of interest. Take, for example, 
board size which has found to be correlated WIth two measures of firm size. namelv sales 
(Pfeffer, 1972) and total assets (Dalton and Kesner. 1987). (jiven these correlations we would 
expect any sample of companies drawn from a group of very large companies to have. a larger 
mean board size than would a randomly chosen sample of all, for example. listed companies. 
Therefore, samples of very large companies will not accurately represent the average board 
size for all listed companies. 
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Table t 
Board Structure Variables 
~-~~,.,.---------<- . 
Varillble Definition Illustrative Studies 
CEO duality Occurs when an individual is both Turner (1985) 
CEO and board chair 
Executive board Occurs if the board chair is also the Donaldson and Davis (1991) 
chair CEO or another executive 
~-. - ...... ...,.-~ .... ----~--
Ooard size Total number of directors (excluding Pfeffer (1972) 
alternative, or deputy, directors) Barnhardt, Marr, and 
----~--.-.------
Rosenstein (1994) 
Number of Outsiders The number of directors who are not Dalton and Kesner (1987) 
-~ ... ,,,,.-..... 
current executives of the company 
Proportion of Number of outsiders divided by Dalton and Kesner (1987) 
Outsiders on Board board size 
.""'"' ..... ~c,... ... • .. ·~_ ... 
Majority of Outsiders Binary variable. Coded as "I" if Kesner, Victor, and Lamont 
greater than 50 per cent of directors (1986) 
are outsiders; "0" otherwise 
Table 2 summarises the findings of past studies in New Zealand along with those findings for 
the years 1 have added. I will now proceed to identifY and examine any changes which have 
occurred in the board structure of New Zealand listed companies since 1962. 
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Table 2 
Summary of New Zealand Board Structure Studies 
1962- 1970- 1972b 1980 1981< 1984d 1984b 1985 1987 1990 1993 
Board size 7.21 6.96 6.66 7.24 6.95 7.12 7.45 6.14 5.70 6.07 
CEO duality (%) 17.83 11.14 10,81 17.81 15.38 14.29 
Exec. chairpersons(%) 20.16 20.30 14.19 18.49 17.48 16.54 
No. of outsiders 5.45 5.60 4.48 4.15 4.57 
Proportion of outsiders 0.75 0.72 0.76 0.73 0.73 0.74 
.;.. Percentage of companies 86.82 87.16 81.16 82.52 82.71 
with a majority of outsiders 
No. of companies 58 160 247 129 208 184 221 148 292 143 133 
Representation" 100 53 100 66 100 100 100 I 
- - -g' 
*The percentage of listed companies represented. 
2.2 Board Size 
There has been a significant change in board size between 1962 and 1993. Ther,e is, however, little 
apparent change in board size over the most recent period from 1987 to 1993, but there does appear 
to have been a reduction in board size (from seven to six directors) between the period up to 1985 
and the later period, 1987 to 1990. To test the significance of this change the available data on 
board size were subjected to an analysis of variance. Full information was available for board data 
for all years except 1962 and 1981 (in these years only the mean board size statistic was available). 
Conducting an analysis of variance on the available data we find an F ratio of 14.62 (p<O.OI). An 
examination of the means and standard deviations of the data for the years analysed indicates that 
board size is, generally speaking, higher in the earlier years and lower in more recent years (refer 
Table J) A Scheffe test reveals significant differences between several years of data. To confirm 
the direction and level of significance of these differences, t-tests were then conducted for the pairs 
of years identified as having significant differences by the Scheffe test (refer Appendix Table 1). As 
expected these t-tests indicate that, compared to earlier years, board size is significantly smaller in 
more recent years. 
On the whole this analysis points to a reduction in the board size of New Zealand listed companies. 
In 1970 the mean board size was around 7 members, whereas in 1993 the mean board size was 
around 6 members. Board size was significantly smaller in each of the years 1987 and 1990 
compared to 1970; and in 1990 compared to 1972. Board size was also significantly smaller in each 
of the years 1987, 1990, and 1993, compared to each of 1980, 1984, and 1985. 
There are two possible explanations for the reduction in board size in more recent years. First, the 
lowest mean board size of 5.69 in 1990 perhaps reflects the levels of insolvency, bankruptcy, 
resignations, and the loss ofJegitimacy of some directors as a consequence of the 1987 stock market 
"crash" Second, the rapid deregulation of the New Zealand economy and the stock market crash 
led companies to "give primary emphasis to their own survival" (Hamilton and ShergiII, 1993, 
p. 104) Companies in survival mode do not have the luxury of excess and unproductive directors, 
and are likely to alter their board structure accordingly. 
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Table 3 
Sample Characteristics for Board Size 
Year No. of Companies Mean Standard Deviation 
1970 160 6.96 1.99 
1972 247 6.66 1.98 
1980 129 7.24 1.91 
1984 221 7.12 2.21 
1985 148 7.45 2.11 
1987 292 6.14 2.17 
1990 143 5.69 2.27 
1993 133 6.07 2.20 
2.3 Number of Outside Directors 
The mean number of outside directors in five years is shown in Table 4. There has been a significant 
change in the number of outsiders on New Zealand boards. An ANOV A for the years of data 
available found a significant F ratio of 14.33 (p<O.OI). A Scheffe test found that there were 
significant differences in the number of outside directors between each of the years 1980 and 1985 
and each of the more recent years 1987, 1990, and 1993. t-tests show that the number of outside 
directors was significantly lower for each of these more recent years compared to the earlier years 
(refer Table 4.6). 
Table 4 
Number of Outside Directors 
Year Mean Standard Deviation 
1980 5.45 2.05 
1985 5.60 1.94 
1987 4.48 2.09 
1990 4.15 2.12 
1993 4.57 2.13 
2.4 Proportion of Outside Directors 
An analysis of variance on the available data (i.e. 1980, 1985, 1987, 1990, and 1993) revealed no 
significant change occurred in the percentage of outsiders on New Zealand boards (F=0.88; not 
significant). The mean proportion of outsiders remained within the range 0.73 to 0.76 over the 1980 
to 1993 period (refer table 5). That no significant change occurred can be explained by the changes 
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I observed in the two variables which determine the proportion of outside directors, namely the 
number of outsiders and board size. These variables declined together, having no significant impact 
on the proportion of directors which were outsiders. 
Table 5 
Proportion of Outside Directors 
Year Mean Standard Deviation 
1980 0.75 0.19 
1985 0.76 0.18 
1987 0.73 0.22 
1990 0.73 0.22 
1993 0.74 0.19 
2.5 Outsider Dominance 
Between 1980 and 1993, outsider dominance of boards of directors was very high with over 80 per 
cent of New Zealand boards being dominated by outside directors. Appendix Table 3 shows the 
results for tests of difference in proportions between the various years for which data were available. 
From this analysis we observe that for no two years was there a significant difference in the 
proportion of companies being controlled by a majority of outside directors. 
2.6 CEO DualitylExecutive Board Chairs 
Between 1980 and 1985 the percentage of companies having CEO duality declined significantly 
(fi'om 17.8 to 10.8 per cent). However from each of the years 1984 and 1985 to 1987 there was a 
significant increase in the incidence of CEO duality. 
In contrast to the changes observed in CEO duality, statistical analysis reveals no significant 
difference in the proportion of companies having executive board chairs between any of the years for 
which data was available. 
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3. International Studies of Board Structure 
3.1 Introduction 
Only two previous papers have attempted to integrate the literature concerning board structure in 
different countries (Dalton, Kesner, and Rechner, 1988; Dalton and Kesner, 1987) Each of these 
papers neglects much of the relevant research. For example, the research on determinants of board 
structure (eg. Pearce and Zahra, 1992) and performance consequence of board structure (eg 
Rechner and Dalton, 1986; Mallette and Fowler, 1992) contain a wealth of data on board structure 
that, to date, has not being brought together. 
Dalton and Kesner's (1987) is the only attempt that has been made to compare board structure 
variables between countries at a given time. This study compared board composition variables for 
50 large companies in each of the United Kingdom, United States and Japan Dalton and Kesner 
concluded that there were differences in CEO duality between these three countries and that 
Japanese companies had a lower proportion of outside directors than either their U.S. or UK. 
counterparts. 
Given the lack of integration of previous research on board structure in different countries, and our 
interest in board structure in New Zealand, I decided to seek answers to the following research 
questions: 
QI: Does board structure in New Zealand differ from that in the United States, United Kingdom, 
Japan, and Australia? 
Q2: What factors account for any differences in board structure between New Zealand, the United 
States, United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia? 
3.2 Data and Method 
One of the major difficulties in conducting international comparative research in the area of 
corporate governance is that: 
International governance is not a research stream per se, but rather a loosely integrated set 
of studies. Consequently, there is little consistency in the choice of theoretical 
perspectives, qr countries and variables being studied. Because these papers are also 
written from a broad array of disciplines, they can be difficult to identify through an article 
search. This difficulty in identifying and locating international governance studies likely 
serves as a disincentive for other researchers to enter this area (Boyd et aI., 1996, p.3) 
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I laving decided to conduct an international comparative study, there were two approaches I could 
take First, I could elect to collect relevant board structure data from other countries, which I could 
then compare to our New Zealand data. Alternatively, I could draw upon existing studies of board 
structure and make comparisons to New Zealand from these. The first option'(collecting the data 
myselt) was eliminated because of the inherent difficulties and time-consuming nature of collecting 
dctailcd board structure data in any country. I chose the second method, namely a literature review 
of existing data, because no comprehensive comparative literature review has previously been 
undertaken in this area I, therefore, hoped that some interesting insights would be gained from an 
investigation of this literature. 
For comparative purposes I collected published board structure data for the United States, United 
Kingdom, Australia, and Japan The United Kingdom and the United States were selected for 
comparison because I believed more studies touching on board structure would be available for 
these countries than anywhere else. Australia was chosen because of its close ties with New Zealand 
and, in particular, its status as our largest trading partner. Japan was chosen because companies 
from this country are believed to have vastly different governance structures than those apparent in 
western countries (Dalton and Kesner, 1987). It is also important to note that the four countries 
selected for comparison with New Zealand are our major trading partners. 
The data on overseas board structure was obtained primarily from studies relating to board structure 
alone, board structure and corporate performance, and company interlocks. In an attempt to obtain 
as many studies as possible I searched abstracting databases (ABI-Inform, Econlit, Social Sciences 
Index) In addition the references in each paper I obtained were examined to identify any further 
papers that may be of use; literatute review papers were especially useful in this regard. 
I will now proceed to compare the board structure of New Zealand listed companies with those of 
Australia, Japan, the United States, and United Kingdom. In making these comparisons it is 
important to be mindful of the relationships observed between firm size and board structure which 
may - by virtue of sampling biases (towards larger companies) - lead to otherwise erroneous 
comparisons being made. For example, if we find larger boards in American compared to New 
Zealand companies - then this may be a function of the data sources used (we would expect, say, 
For/lIlle 500 companies to be very much larger than New Zealand Stock Exchange listed 
companies) Given this concern, I am only attempting to obtain a prima facie understanding of 
international board structures. 
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3.3 Country Comparisons 
3.3.1 Comparisons with Australia 
Table 6 shows board size for Australian Companies and comparisons with New Zealand companies. 
The Australian data is not strictly comparable to that for New Zealand because of their bias towards 
larger Australian companies. Nevertheless, examination of the available data highlights some 
differences. New Zealand listed companies appear to have lower mean board sizes than large 
Australian companies. Around 1980 this difference was about one director. However, by around 
1990, the Australian companies have approximately two more directors than do New Zealand 
companies. This situation appears to have arisen because the mean board size of New Zealand listed 
companies has declined between 1980 and 1990 (from 7.24 to 5.70), whereas the mean board size 
for larger Australian companies has remained relatively stable over a similar period (8.33 in 1979 
and 8.37 in 1991). 
Table 6 
Board Size of Australian versus New Zealand Companies 
Australia New Zealand 
Basis for Average Average 
Year Sample Selection Board Size Year Board Size 
1959a Top 250 Assets 6.60 
1979a Top 251 Assets 8.33 1980 7.24 
I 986b Top 250 Assets 8.62 1987 6.14 
1991b Top 250 Revenue 8.37 1990 5.70 
.a .b « Sources. Stemng and Wan (1984), Alexander and Murray (19 (2). 
The only other board structure variable that has been given research attention for Australian 
companies is CEO duality. Kiel and Blannerhasett (1984) in their study of the top 50 Australian 
listed companies and found that 8 companies (16 per cent) had a board chair that was also CEO. 
Unfortunately, these authors do not give the year they obtained their data for, making a comparison 
with New Zealand data impossible. 
3.3.2 Comparisons with the United Kingdom 
As with Australia, most of the available board composition data for the United Kingdom relates to 
board size (refer T~ble 7) Hiner (1967) found that the mean board size of 345 randomly selected 
British listed companies was 5.9 directors in 1962. This compares to 7 21 directors in Laurent's 
(1971) study of 58 large New Zealand listed companies in the same year. 
to 
More recently, Dalton and Kesner (1987) in their sample of 50 large UK. companies for the year 
1986 found an average board size of I I 44 directors. This compares with a mean board size of only 
745 directors for our 1985 sample of New Zealand listed companies. However, this difference may 
be attributable to the size bias in Dalton and Kesner's (1987) sample. 
Table 7 
80ard Size and Duality in United Kingdom Companies 
Study Year No. Mean Board Size Duali!!. 
Hiner (1967) 1955 510 8.31 33.92 
Hiner (1967) 1960 704 8.07 36.80 
Hiner ( 1967) 1962 345 5.90 
Dalton and Kesner ( 19871 1986 50 11.44 30.00 
Both Dalton and Kesner (1987) and Li (1994) examined the proportion of outsiders on the boards of 
UK companies. Dalton and Kesner (1987) found this statistic to be 064 for 50 large companies in 
1986, whereas more recently Li (1994) found it to be 0.36 for 60 UK. based multinationals in 1987. 
On the face of it these two statistics appear incompatible. In any event it appears that New Zealand 
companies have a higher proportion of outsiders on their boards at this time (0.76 in 1985 and 0.73 
in 1987) 
3.3.3 Comparisons with the United States 
More studies have touched on various aspects on board structure in the United States than anywhere 
else However, these studies have typically focussed on very large companies (Boyd et at., 1996). 
Boartl.\·ize 
I.arge U S. companies appear to have a mean board size of around 12 directors (refer Table 8). 
Only one study (Schellenger, Wood, and Tashakori, 1989) examines a random sample of U.S. listed 
companies. That study found a mean board size of 6.58 directors for 1986. This compares to 745 
directors in 1985 and 6.14 directors in 1987 for New Zealand listed companies. It appears that, 
around 1986 anyhow, New Zealand and US. listed companies had similar board sizes. 
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Table 8 
Board Size in United States Companies 
Mean 
Study Sample Year(s) Board Size 
Gordon (1945) 155 largest U.S. corporations 1935 13.5 
Kaplan (1994) 146 companies with the 1980 14.88 
highest sales on Fortune's list 
of the largest industrials in 
1980 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) 324 U.S. listed companies 1981-85 122 
who appointed an outside 
director 
Kesner (1987) 250 randomly selected 1983 12.48 
Fortune 500 companies 
Lee et al. (1992) 58 MBOs, 1983 to 1989 U.S. 1983-89 11.45 
listed companies 
Brickley et al. (1994) 247 firms listed on the NYSE 1984-86 11.96 
between 1984 and 1986 
Dalton and Kesner (1987) 50 large US. corporations 1986 12.96 
Schellenger et al. (1989) 526 randomly selected U.S. 1986 6.58 
listed companies 
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Table 9 
Proportion of Outside Directors in United States Companies 
Proportion 
Study Sample Year(s) Outsiders 
Kesner and Dalton (1985) 266 companies listed in 1970 0.46 
Forbes from 1970 to 1980 
Kesner and Dalton (1985) 266 companies listed in 1980 0.57 
Forbes from 1970 to 1980 
Rechner and Dalton ( 1(86) 30 companies from the Top 1980 068 
100 Fortune 500 
Kesner et a!. (1986) Average for 1980-84 of 1980-84 0.70 
proportion of outsiders on 
384 companies listed in the 
Fortune 500 
Rosenstein and Wyatt 324 US listed ~ompanies 1981-85 0.66 
( 19(0) who appointed an outside 
director 
Kesner (1987) 250 randomly selected 1983 0.64 
Fortune 500 com~anies 1983 
Lee et al (1992) 58 MBOs, 1983 to 1989 US 1983-89 059 
listed companies 
Brickley et al. (1994) 247 firms listed on the NYSE 1984-86 0.69 
between 1984 and 1986 that 
Dalton and Kesner (1987) 50 large U S corporations 1986 0.70 
Schellenger et al. (1989) 526 randomly selected U S 1986 065 
listed companies 
Li (1994) 192 US firms taken from the 1987 0.74 
Directory of Multinationals 
Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk 176 Fortune 500 companies not given but 060 
(1991 ) appears to he 
early 1980s 
\3 
Table to 
Number of Outside Directors in United States Companies 
Number of 
Study Sample Year(s) Outsiders 
Kaplan (1994) 146 companies with the 1980 9.57 
highest sales on Fortune's list 
of the largest industrials in 
1980 
Rosenstein and Wyatt 324 US listed companies 1981-85 8.0 
( 1990) who appointed an outside 
director 
Lee et at ( 19(2) 58 MBOs, 1983 to 1989 US 1983-89 7.50 
listed companies 
Dalton and Kesner ( 1(87) 50 large U S. Corporations 1986 902 
Proportion (~rollt!iide director ... 
There is no indication that the proportion of outside directors on boards is associated with company 
size This was shown in Dalton and Kesner's (1987) study of 50 large companies in each of the 
U.K, US, and Japan. Given this results relating to dillerences in the proportion of outside 
directors between countries should be informative. 
Results of studies on the proportion of outsiders on U.S. boards do not show any trend (refer Table 
9). However, it appears that between 1980 and 1990 mean proportion of outsiders on the boards of 
large U.S companies was between 0.60 and 0.70. This is somewhat lower than in New Zealand 
companies where the average proportion of outside directors over the same period was between 
0.73 and 076 per cent (refer Table 2) 
Numher (~r outsille director ... 
The only studies which have looked at the number of outside directors on the boards of American 
companies have examined large corporations (refer Tahle 1 (l) lienee. no meaningful comparison 
can be made between New Zealand and United States companies with regards the number of outside 
directors These studies fOlllld that large lJ S corporations had on average about 8 outside directors 
(refer Tahle (0) 
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CEO {fulllity 
In contrast to New Zealand companies, American companies appear to have a significantly higher 
incidence of CEO duality (refer Table II) Estimates of CEO duality for US companies vary 
widely, from 46 per cent in 1980 (Boyd, 1994) to 89 per cent for 1980 to 1984 (Kesner et ai, 
1986) The most recent study indicates that 76 per cent of American companies had a dual CEO 
structure in 1987. This compares to only 10.81 per cent for 1985 .md 1781 per cent for 1987 
among New Zealand listed companies. It therefore appears in any event that New Zealand listed 
companies have an extremely low incidence orCEO duality compared to American companies. 
Table II 
CEO Duality in United States Companies 
% with CEO 
Study Sa,"ple Year(s) Duality 
Rechner and Dalton ( 1991 ) 14 I companies listed in the 1978-83 78.7 
For/line 50() b~tween 1978 
and 1983, with stable 
governance structures 
Boyd (1994) 192 U S corporations 1980 46 
Dalton and Kesner (1987) 50 large lJ S corporations 1986 82 
Donaldson and Davis 321 lJ S corporations 1987 76 
( 199 12 
Kesner, Victor, and Lamont 384 Fortune 500 companies 1980-84 89 
( 1(86) listed between 1980 and 1984 
3.3.4 Comparisons with .Japan 
Each of the studies examining board size in Japanese companies has used very large companies 
(Kaplan, 1994, Dalton and Kesner, 1(87), so once again any comparisons with New Zealand are of 
dubious value It is however interesting to note that the two studies just mentioned found board 
sizes of 22 5 and 210 members respectively, which are extremely large by any standards (refer Table 
12) The large size of Japanese boards has not been explained by previolls researchers. 
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Table 12 
Board Structure in Japan 
Mean No. of Proportion 
Board Out- Out- CEO 
Study Sample Year Size siders siders ()uality 
Kaplan ( 19(4) I 19 Japanese companies 1980 2249 086 
included in the 1980 list 
of Fortune 500 largest 
foreign industrials 
Dalton and 50 large Japanese 1986 21.04 10 17 0.51 109% 
Kesner (1987) companies 
The only study to examine CEO duality in Japanese companies is that of Dalton and Kesner (1987) 
who found that only 10.9 per cent of their sample of large Japanese companies had this board 
characteristic in 1986. This compares with a similar figure of 10.8 per cent for New Zealand 
companies in 1985, but a considerably higher figure for New Zealand companies of 17.8 per cent in 
1987. The difference that is indicated for this later year may be due to the adoption of a board 
leadership structure by New Zealand boards leading up to the 1987 stock market "crash". 
The lindings of previous studies with regards the number of outsiders on Japanese boards are 
confusing (refer Table 12) Kaplan (1994) found that only 086 outsiders were represented on the 
average board during 1980. In contrast, Dalton and Kesner (1987) found that 10.2 outsiders were 
represented on the average Japanese board in 1986. There is no sound explanation for a massive 
increase in outsider representation over the 1980-85 period, leading us to conclude that the 
difference may be attributable to sampling bias. Given this possibility I elected not to compare 
Japanese and New Zealand boards on this variable, as I believed that any dilTerences observed would 
in all likelihood be dubious. 
Only one study has investigated the proportion of outsiders on Japanese boards is that of Dalton and 
Kesner (1987) who found this statistic to be 0 51 for 1986. This compares to somewhere around 75 
per cent at the same time I()r New Zealand listed companies It therefore appears that New Zealand 
companies have a higher proportion of outsiders on their boards than Japanese companies. Insight 
into why t his may be the case is provided by Dalton, Kesner and Rechner ( 1(88) 
In Japan .. the role of the director appears to be less the steward of the stockholder than 
\\iould be expected in either the United Kingdom or the United States. The "watchdog" 
model of outside directorship, then, may be largely unnecessary for the typical Japanese 
corporation. (Dalton, Kesner and Rechner. 1988, p. 101) 
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4. Discussion and Conclusions 
The analysis undertaken in section two of this paper indicates several key changes in board stmcture 
in New Zealand. First, board size has declined from around 7 members between 1962 and 1985 and 
6 members more recently (1987 to 19(3). As mentioned previously this reduction may be a result of 
the stock market crash and the pressures of economic deregulation 
Interestingly, the number of outside directors declined from around 5.5 per board in 1980 and 1985 
to around 4 5 per board in the more recent period of 1987 through 1990 Thus, it appears that the 
reduction in board size that we have observed is due to fewer outsiders being represented on boards. 
Following the previously outlined argument, this may indicate that such directors were more likely 
to constitute "dead wood" than were insiders, and are more likely than insiders to have suffered 
legitimacy problems following the sharemarket "crash" 
With regards representation by non-executive directors, New Zealand boards were found to typically 
be dominated by outsiders The Cadbury Report (1992) in the United Kingdom prescribed a "Code 
of Best Practice". Among the features of boards seen as desirable in this Code was that, " ... the 
representation of non-executive lie outsider 1 directors on the board should be sutlicient in number 
to carry weight in the board's deliberations. 
In this respect New Zealand boards appear well equipped to peri<.mn their governance role 
ellectively, with over 80 per cent of our boards having a majority of outside directors. Furthermore, 
by 1993, approximately three-quarters of the members on the average board were outside directors. 
The Cadbury Report (1992) also recommends that," there should be a clear division of 
responsibilities at the top of any large company between the chairman and the chief executive otlicer 
... ". Only 14.3 per cent of New Zealand listed companies had chief executives who were also board 
chairperson, indicating that such companies, prima facie, have an effective board leadership 
stmcture. 
The findings in section three of this paper are indicative of some dillerences in board stmcture 
between New Zealand and each of Japan, Australia, the U.K, and the US Ideally, future research 
in this area should take care to study representative samples of companies in different countries, 
rather than just very large companies, thereby giving researchers the opportunity to make more 
generalisable observations about dillerences in board stmcture between countries. 
Some explanations as to why governance stmctures in the U.K, U.S., and Japan may be different 
have been provided by previous research. The corporate stmcture of Japanese companies in 
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particular is seen to differentiate such companies markedly from those of most western countries. In 
particular it has been noted that, ".. the typical Japanese firm is comprised of very few owners 
whose financing comes from large financial institutions who work very closely with top 
management" (Dalton, Kesner, and Rechner, 1988, pp. 100-1). In a similar vein Prevezer and 
Ricketts (1994) note that, in comparison to UK. companies (and presumably US. companies too) 
[shareholders of Japanese firms 1 are largely insiders, having some kind of commercial 
contact with the company. Thus, although the structure of shareholding ... the nature of 
institutional shareholding is very different ... The institutions are not independent pension 
funds and insurance companies with their own interests and obligations . They are instead 
institutions such as banks who may have provided loan finance; supplying companies who 
may have a long-running association; or other companies linked by cross-shareholdings. 
The second important feature of Japanese shareholding is that tradeability of rights is more 
constrained than in the U.K. It is estimated that nearly two-thirds of equity is held in the 
form of stable shareholding-all/ci kahllflllshi-which is distinct from interlocking 
shareholding-kahllshiki moclliai (Prevezer and Ricketts, 1994, pp24S-6) 
In addition to shareholding differences in Japanese (compared to western companies), it has been 
observed that corporate boards in Japan are more "consensus orientated and less CEO-dominated" 
than their U.S counterparts (Kaplan, 1994, p.S20). This may also help account for the apparently 
low incidence of CEO duality among Japanese companies and the apparently large boards of 
Japanese boards (presumably consensus decision-making involves the participation of many relevant 
parties, which may be represented on the board) 
The discussion just outlined indicates that Japanese companies may have different board structures 
than those of their western counterparts by virtue of differences in the nature of corporate ownership 
and decision-making It is less clear why differences in board structure of western countries occur. 
It would be instructive for future international comparative studies to track board structure in 
dillerent countries on an historical basis lienee, any differences in board structure which may be 
present hetween countries today could be attributed to, say, how industry and corporate control has 
evolved in ditlcrent countries Take for example the following 
the British tradition of corporate accountability has been traced to the philosophical 
writings of Bentham Bentham applied utilitarian principles to management, with the idea 
that there is a concept of accountability for management actions which should result in 
bcneticial consequences (Boyd et al , 1996, P 7). 
Ilowever, despite the calls made for international comparative research on corporate governance, 
one must remain somewhat sceptical of its value It is inevitable that the variables of interest to 
academics (such as those I have used) provide only vague indicators of whether or not a board is in 
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fact effective. Academic research on boards of directors has largely been driven by convenience of 
data collection, with variables such as board size, outsider representation and CEO duality being 
readily observable and, typically, easily obtainable from secondary data sources, hence their use, and 
the theories revolving around these variables. 
It would be more productive for researchers to focus on what makes some boards more effective 
that others. For example, to say that a larger board is likely to be more effective that a smaller board 
is somewhat simplistic. The quality and the diversity of the directors on the board is what one is 
more likely to be really talking about, and board size may only provide a proxy for these factors. 
Some research on the effectiveness of boards has been conducted. for example Bradshaw, Murray, 
and Wolpin (1992), Cook and Brown (1990) and Kovner (1985). However, research in this area 
has typically focused on organisations in the health care sector. More general observations on 
eflectiveness have been made by some (Leighton and Thain, 1993; Thain and Leighton, 1988; 
Weidenbaum, 1986), but empirical research appears more-or-Iess non-existent. This appears the 
most promising area for international governance research 
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Year 
1970 
1972 
1980 
1984 
1985 
Appendix Table 1 
t-tests for Board Size'" 
1987 1990 
4063 5.153 
4.268 
5222 6.\09 
5023 5.935 
6070 6.821 
1993 
4.670 
4.422 
5.409 
All slgmficant at 1% Icvel, blank cclls denotc no 
significant difference between years 
Appendix Table 2 
t-tests for Number of Outsiders'" 
Year 1987 1990 1993 
1980 4.444 5.135 3.408 
1985 5572 6081 3226 
Alit-tests are slglllficant at 1% levcl 
Appendix Table 3 
Test of Difference in Proportions (p-values) 
1980 
1985 -084 
1987 1.421 1589 
1990 981 I 106 -.342 
1993 926 1046 -.381 -.041 I 
Year 1980 1985 1987 1990 I 
- -
Appendix Table 4 
Duality: Test of Ilifference in Proportions hl-values)'" 
1980 
1985 1675" 
1984 1 608 0173 
1987 0.005 -1886" -\.918" 
1990 0542 -1054 -1.158 0.632 
1993 0782 -1.316 -0.881 0.903 0.256 
Year 1980 1984 1985 1987 1990 
. All p-valucs arc slglllficant at 10% Icvel 
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I 
I 
Appendix Table 5 
Executive Board Chairs: Test of Difference in Proportions (p-values) 
1980 
1981 -0.029 
1985 1.320 1.359 
1987 0.401 0.440 -1.314 
1990 0.564 0.598 -0.770 0.257 
1993 0.756 0.791 -0.547 0.487 0.208 I 
Year 1980 1981 1985 1987 1990 I 
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